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A Philosophy of Culture Approach to Inter-religious Understanding 
Michael S. Jones 
 
Introduction 
 I have stated previously that one important step in making Blaga known outside 
of Romania will be to show how his philosophy leads to fresh insights when applied to 
contemporary philosophical issues being discussed outside of Romania.1 This article is an 
attempt to put this suggestion into practice. The question of the possibility, extent, 
problems, and benefits of inter-religious and inter-ideological2 understanding and 
communication has received much attention in recent European and American 
philosophy. These same issues are being discussed by non-philosophers and outside of 
the West. If Blaga’s philosophy can be used to shed new light on these issues it may help 
to make Blaga known outside of Romania. 
 One important aspect of the question of inter-religious understanding is the role of 
culture. The importance of culture as the context of belief formation and even in the 
formation of the modes of rationality has been fairly widely acknowledged, but few 
detailed analyses of this aspect of culture have appeared. As any Romanian philosopher 
should know, the philosophy of culture was Blaga’s hallmark. Prior to his banishment 
from the university by Romania’s post-WWII socialist government, Blaga taught 
philosophy at the University of Cluj, where a special chair in philosophy of culture was 
created in his honor. Blaga published more books on the philosophy of culture than on 
any other single philosophical subject. Blaga’s philosophy of culture is a systematic, 
detailed, and innovative analysis of the origin, purpose, nature, and effect of culture on 
human life, productivity, and cognition. Its breadth makes its application to religion and 
to the particular issues at hand an easy task. 
Blaga and the Philosophy of Culture 
 One interesting aspect of Blaga’s philosophy is its explication of the role of 
culture in human cognition. Although Blaga opens his systematic philosophy with 
epistemology, and brings metaphysics into every aspect of his system, many have 
interpreted culture as holding the central place in Blaga’s system. The philosophy of 
culture is interwoven throughout all the other areas of his philosophy. 
 Culture is, according to Blaga, the sine qua non of humanness.3 It is culture more 
than anything else that distinguishes humanity from other forms of animal life.4 
1 Michael S. Jones, “Blaga, John Hick, ∏i Problema Diversit|⇔ii Religioase,” in 
Meridian 
Blaga, vol. 3, ed. Irina Petra∏ (Cluj-Napoca: Casa C|r⇔ii de tiin⇔|, 2003), 247. 
2 In this context the term “ideology” is being used to refer to any systematic body of 
beliefs, including religions and belief systems that are not usually considered religions 
but that share significant similarities with religion, such as Marxism, scientism, 
humanism, and other such systems. This use of the term “ideology” has precedent in the 
World Council of Churches’ Guidelines on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and 
Ideologies (Geneva: WCC, 1979) and in other publications of the World Council of 
Churches. 
3 Lucian Blaga, Fiin⇔a Istoric|. In Trilogia Cosmologic|, ed. Dorli Blaga. Vol. 11 of 
Opere. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1988, 292. 
                                                 
According to Blaga’s analysis, a culture is a collective product of human creativity 
actuated through a given “stylistic matrix” and within a particular set of concrete 
circumstances. It is a “precipitate” of the fullness of human existence. Full human 
existence involves living in the face of mystery and for the revelation thereof. Culture is 
an inevitable result of this human attempt to reveal/depict/grasp mystery. 
 Every cultural creation involves three essential elements: concrete material, 
metaphorical expression, and style (analyzable into a matrix of elements). The concrete 
materials of a culture are the physical, intellectual, or spiritual materials that humans 
utilize in their creations. These are used metaphorically to express ideas, emotions, or 
intuitions that transcend the mere material itself. The particular way that the concrete is 
metaphorically used reflects the style of the user, which is the product of a number of 
factors called the “stylistic matrix.” 
The Categories of the Understanding and the Abyssal Categories 
 A very important aspect of Blaga’s philosophy of culture is his original analysis 
of the categories of the human mind and how these categories relate to human culture. 
Although the Kantian influence on this area of Blaga’s thought is unmistakable, Blaga 
departs radically from Kant’s understanding of the categories.5 According to Blaga’s 
theory, humans are equipped with not one but two sets of intellectual categories. The first 
of these he names “the categories of the understanding.” These categories correspond 
fairly closely to the Kantian categories. Their role is the organization of sensory data in 
type I cognition (“paradisaic cognition”).6 
 Contrary to many scientists, who take categories such as time and space to be 
objective realities, Blaga agrees with Kant that the categories of the understanding are 
subjective. Kant’s reason for drawing this conclusion is that the conceptual contents of 
the categories surpass the contents of experiential data, and therefore cannot themselves 
be a product of experience, and thus must have their source in the mind itself. Blaga 
writes that the climate (influenced by the Enlightenment and the growing influence of 
natural science) within which Kant worked prevented him from positing a supernatural 
source of the categories, and therefore Kant concluded that if they are a product of the 
mind, then they must be subjective.7 Nonetheless, the conclusion that subjectivity is the 
only alternative left after the elimination of the possibility of an experiential origin of the 
categories is mistaken. There remains the possibility that the categories are the product of 
a supernatural source, and furthermore that this source created them as objective. 
 In Blaga’s view, the categories are in fact the result of a supernatural source: the 
Creator.8 However, Blaga is in agreement with Kant that the categories are subjective. 
4 Ibid., 498. 
5 See especially tiin⇔| ∏i Crea⇔ie, in Trilogia Valorilor, ed. Dorli Blaga. Vol. 10 of 
Opere (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1987), chapters 18 (“C>teva probleme de teoria 
cunoa∏terii”) and 19 (“Doua tipuri de cunoa∏tere”). 
6 Ibid., 176; Lucian Blaga, Geneza metaforei ∏i sensul culturii, in Trilogia Culturii, ed. 
Dorli Blaga. Vol. 9 of Opere (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1985) 407. 
7 Blaga, tiin⇔| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 184–85. 
8 Blaga’s postulation of the existence of a creator of the universe is discussed in the 
chapter on metaphysics in my forthcoming book, The Metaphysics of Religion: Lucian 
Blaga and Contemporary Philosophy, Farleigh-Dickenson University Press, 2006. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Blaga’s reason for this interpretation of the categories is quite different from Kant’s, and 
has to do with the structure and purpose of cognition. Blaga’s reason for believing the 
categories to be subjective is that, according to his proposed metaphysics, in order to 
further its purposes in creation, the Creator does not permit humans to have objective 
(“positive-adequate”) cognition. The categories are one of the means utilized by the 
Creator to guarantee that humanity does not achieve objective cognition. The categories 
act as both facilitators of cognition and as limits to cognition, enabling subjective 
knowledge but preventing objective knowledge.9 
 According to Kant, the categories of the understanding are a fixed set that is 
necessarily possessed by all people. In other words, according to Kant all people have the 
same immutable categories of the understanding. Spengler argued, contra Kant, that 
particular sentiments of spatiality are culturally relative. He argues that there are at least 
nine different space/time sentiments that are found in different cultures.10 
 In reflecting on these views, Blaga observes that, while the perceptions of space, 
time, and so on appear to be universal, space and time are also constructed differently in 
different cultures.11 The categories of the understanding, though subjective, are not 
affected by culture (and do not bear the imprint of style) because they are not human 
creations—they are created by the Creator.12 He accounts for the apparent variability of 
the categories by proposing that humans have two sets of categories, not one: the 
cognitive categories of the conscious and the abyssal categories of the subconscious (also 
called the “stylistic categories”).13 The former are invariable, but the latter are quite 
variable. Space and time (as determined by the cognitive categories) are universal 
concrete horizons of the conscious. However, their “texture” is determined by the abyssal 
categories of each individual’s subconscious, and is therefore variable. For example, 
space can be conceived as being tridimensional, flat, undulatory, arched, or other ways.14 
9 tiin⇔| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 185–86. This is discussed in more detail in the chapters on 
metaphysics and epistemology in Jones, The Metaphysics of Religion. 
10 Lucian Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, in Trilogia Culturii, ed. Dorli Blaga. Vol. 9 of Opere 
(Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1985) 101–2, 108, 136. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of 
the West, see vol. 1, ch. 4, “Makrokosmos: The Symbolism of the World-picture and the 
Space Problem,” especially the subchapter “Spatial Depth as ‘Time Become Rigid’: The 
prime symbol.” 
11 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 137–38. 
12 Blaga, Geneza Metaforei ∏i Sensul Culturii, 402; tiin⇔| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 199, 211. 
According to Blaga, Nietzsche argued that the categories are human creations and are 
influenced by culture (ibid., 164). 
13 While the existence of a subconscious within the mind is generally taken for granted 
today, in Blaga’s day it was still a controversial issue. Blaga was a contemporary of 
Freud and Jung and interacts with their views on the subconscious, see Orizont ∏i Stil, 
97. Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu contrasts Blaga with Freud and Jung in his chapter 
“Filosofia culturii ∏i psihoanaliz| la Lucian Blaga,” in Dimensiunea Metafizic| a Operei 
lui Lucian Blaga, ed. Angela Botez and A. Firu⇔|, 271–75. Regarding the stylistic 
categories, see Blaga, tiin⇔| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 174–76, and ch. 9 (“Doua tipuri de 
cunoa∏tere”); and Geneza Metaforei ∏i Sensul Culturii, ch. 5 (“Categoriile abisale”). 
14 Ibid., 413. 
                                                 
Based on its particular set of abyssal categories, the human subconscious attributes to 
space and time details of structure that are similar to but more determined than the 
indeterminate structures of space and time in the conscious.15 
 The abyssal categories lie at the base of all cultural creations.16 They form a 
complex that Blaga names the “stylistic matrix.”17 The immense number of combinations 
of the stylistic categories possible within an individual’s stylistic matrix accounts for the 
plethora of possible and actual cultures.18 Because of this important role in forming 
culture, the abyssal categories are constitutive of the substance of humanity, whereas the 
cognitive categories merely enable the integration of objects to the conscious.19 
 Structurally, the details of the cognitive categories are immutable and universal, 
while the details of the abyssal categories are variable and individual.20 It is sometimes 
the case that there are parallel cognitive and abyssal categories, such as in the case of 
time and space. These are what Blaga calls “doublets of horizons.”21 The two categories 
of a doublet are complementary but differ from each other in detail.  
  Both cognitive and abyssal categories are part of the Creator’s plan for protecting 
and enhancing created existence.22 While the specific cognitive categories are direct 
creations of the Creator, the specific stylistic categories are human creations. The 
cognitive categories are one way that the Creator implements transcendent censorship, 
while the abyssal categories are a means of implementing “transcendent braking.” The 
two types of categories working together to fulfill the Creator’s “principle of the 
conservation of mystery.”23  
The Stylistic Matrix and its Key Components 
 Each human subconscious possesses a “stylistic matrix,” a set of stylistic 
categories that determines the results of its creative endeavors.24 This matrix is the sum 
of all the stylistic categories and their influences upon a person’s creativity and is 
composed of four primary factors and an unspecified number of secondary factors.25 Two 
15 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 109. In the words of Vasile Musc|, with the introduction of the 
stylistic categories, “Blaga operates a transfer of criticism from the upper level of the 
conscience, the seat of the cognitive activities the analysis of which preoccupied Kant, to 
the dark basement of the subconscious, the hearth of creative activity.” Vasile Musc|, 
“Specificul crea⇔iei culturale române∏ti în c>mpul filosofiei”), in Lucian Blaga, ed. 
Ghi∏e, Botez, and Botez, 469. 
16 Blaga, Fiin⇔a Istoric|, 498. 
17 Blaga, Geneza Metaforei ∏i Sensul Culturii, 409. 
18 Ibid., 412–413. 
19 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 133. 
20 Blaga, Geneza Metaforei ∏i Sensul Culturii, 414. 
21 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, ch. 7, “Teoria dubletelor.” 
22 This plan is discussed in detail in Jones, The Metaphysics of Religion. 
23 Blaga, Fiin⇔a Istoric|, 490, 502–3; tiin⇔| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 176 (footnote). 
24 The term “stylistic field” is sometimes used as a synonym for stylistic matrix, as in 
Fiin⇔a Istoric|, ch. 5, “C>mpurile stilistice”; see also Fiin⇔a Istoric|, 420, 485. 
25 Blaga, tiin⇔| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 176–78. In some places (e.g., Orizont ∏i Stil, 177) Blaga 
lists five factors, listing the spatial and temporal horizons of the subconscious separately. 
In other places he includes the spatial and temporal horizons under the single heading 
                                                 
different creative styles can be separated by as little as one of these secondary factors.26 
The idea of a stylistic matrix explains why and how creations within a particular culture 
bear certain similarities and also why they are not identical.27 Furthermore, it is that 
which enables a creation to have a sense of fittingness and context. A judgment that a 
particular creation “lacks style” may be nothing more than an indication that there are 
subtle differences between the matrices of the creator and the critic.28 Conversely, the 
ability of one culture to appreciate the creations of another is explained by the shared 
elements of their stylistic matrices, which can enable reciprocal understanding.29 
 Stylistic matrices are shaped by the physical and spiritual environment in which 
the person or community lives.30 They are usually conservative by nature: they are 
resistant to criticism and change.31 This explains why two different cultures sometimes 
coexist within the same physical environment: their stylistic matrices were formed at a 
time when the cultures were geographically separate, and although they are not 
indifferent to their current cultural setting, they do retain much of their old cultural 
formation. However, it is possible for the factors that make up a particular stylistic matrix 
to change, which leads to a change in the stylistic matrix itself.32 
 The four primary components of any stylistic matrix are: 1. The horizon of the 
subconscious; 2. An axiological accent; 3. A particular sense of destiny; and 4. A 
particular formative aspiration (nazuin⇔a formativ|).33 The first of these, the horizon of 
the subconscious, refers to the particular way that a person’s subconscious mind 
structures space and time, and therefore the particular forms of the abyssal categories that 
imprint the spatial and temporal aspects of a person’s creations.34 There are at least three 
possible temporal horizons of the subconscious: past, present, and future. These horizons 
sometimes combine and overlap, causing blurring or hybridizing of the horizon.35 The 
“horizon of the subconscious” (e.g., Orizont ∏i Stil, 175). I follow this later practice in 
my enumeration of four factors. 
26 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 175. 
27 Ibid., 177, 182–83; Fiin⇔a Istoric|, 420–39. 
28 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 177-8. 
29 Ibid., 184–85. The chapter “Interferen⇔e stilistice” in Fiin⇔a Istoric| discusses the 
different ways that stylistic matrices relate to each other. 
30 Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic⇔ionar de termeni de filosofice ai lui Lucian Blaga. 
(Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedia, 2000), 218. 
31 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 179. 
32 This is discussed in the chapter “Durata factorilor stilistici, in Fiin⇔a Istoric|. 
33 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 152ff., 175, 179; Geneza Metaforei ∏i Sensul Culturii, 410. 
34 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 109, 179; concerning space see Orizont ∏i Stil, ch. 4 (“Cultur| 
∏i spatiu”) and ch. 5 (“Intre peisaj ∏i orizont incon∏tient”); concerning time see 
Orizont ∏i Stil, ch. 6 (“Orizonturi temporale”). A variety of spatial horizons are possible. 
Blaga gives the following examples of spatial horizons of particular cultures: Arabian 
culture—veiled space; Babylonian culture—twin space; Chinese culture—rolled space; 
Greek culture—spherical space; popular Romanian culture—undulatory space; Saxon 
culture—infinite, tridimensional space. Orizont ∏i Stil, 107 (footnote), 117. 
35 Ibid., 120–21, 127. 
                                                                                                                                                 
temporal horizon of a culture is reflected in the creative constructions of that culture, 
including its histories and its metaphysical creations.36 
 The second component of a stylistic matrix, the “axiological accent,” refers to an 
attitudinal reflex of the subconscious that is superimposed upon the spatial and temporal 
horizons. Although the subconscious is intrinsically united with its horizons, it is not 
always in complete accord with them.37 The axiological accent is a valuation of the 
respective horizons of the subconscious, an evaluation that is positive, negative, or 
neutral, resulting in an affirmation of, negation of, or neutrality toward the spatial or 
temporal horizon. A particular horizon can have different senses depending on the accent 
it receives.38 A negative axiological accent does not result in the annulling of the 
particular horizon, but rather in that horizon being used in a negative way in the 
construction of cultural creations.39 
 The third component of a stylistic matrix, the “sense of destiny,” refers to the 
attitude or predisposition of the subconscious that influences how it views life as a 
trajectory within the horizon of the subconscious.40 This movement can be one of 
advancing toward the horizon (which Blaga labels “anabasic”), one of withdrawal from 
the horizon (“catabasic”), or it can be static (“neutral” or “vegetative”).41 
 The fourth of the key components of the stylistic matrix, the “formative 
aspiration,” refers to the human drive to imprint one’s own inner form on the things 
around oneself.42 This drive takes different forms in different cultures. Blaga notes three 
distinct possible forms that the formative aspiration takes: individualized, standardized, 
and elementized.43 Through each of these approaches those that employ them aspire to 
reveal “truth,” to portray through their creativity things as they really are. Each believes 
that his/her respective approach is the correct approach.44 To the question whether their 
attempts reflect objective reality or a “style of thought,” Blaga affirms the latter.45 
36 The first chapter of Fiin⇔a Istoric| contains a long analysis of the interaction of the 
stylistic matrices and historiographies of various cultures: Egyptian, Persian, Indian, 
Chinese, Greek, and medieval and modern Europe. Blaga, Fiin⇔a Istoric|, 354–66. 
37 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 141. Although this suggestion may sound somewhat odd, Blaga 
points out that there are numerous common examples of similar phenomena. For 
example, a person is intrinsically linked to his/her self, but this does not entail that s/he 
positively values all of his/her qualities. 
38 Ibid., 150. 
39 Ibid., 142; see 142–51 for illuminating examples of this. 
40 Here, as elsewhere in his philosophy, Blaga is forced to make recourse to metaphoric 
language to express his concepts. 
41 Ibid., 152; for illuminating examples of this see 152-55. 
42 Ibid., 157. 
43 Ibid., 158: modul individualizant, modul tipizant, modul stihial (elementarizant). 
44 Ibid., 158. See also Blaga, Ferestre Colorate, 359. 
45 Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 161–62. For illuminating examples of this see 159-70. Blaga 
hints that the sense of a cultural creation is only appreciated when one steps out of the 
habitual mode of observation (individualized or standardized) and views it from the 
perspective of its own formative aspiration, 167. 
                                                 
 These four primary components and an unnumbered quantity of secondary 
components make up the stylistic matrix of the subconscious. The stylistic matrix is the 
inner horizon of the subconscious, and it functions according to its own norms, relatively 
independent of the conscious. The stylistic matrix is responsible for the unity of attitudes, 
accents, and aspirations that distinguish one culture from another and that give to a 
person’s conscious the support of continuity and to a person’s subconscious the 
connection to a collectivity.46 Furthermore, the existence of stylistic matrices witnesses to 
the creative destiny given to humanity by the Creator.47 
Philosophy of Culture and Blaga’s Epistemology 
 Blaga’s philosophy of culture has a direct impact on his epistemology.48 
According to Blaga’s analysis, there are two types of cognition: type I cognition 
(paradisaic) and type II cognition (luciferic). Type I cognition increases knowledge 
quantitatively, through the numerical reduction of the mysteries of existence by adding 
new facts to human knowledge. It utilizes the cognitive categories. Type II cognition 
increases knowledge qualitatively, through deepening the understanding of the mystery 
of a cognitive object. This deepening of the understanding involves creative constructs 
that provide theoretical explanations of the phenomena in question. Since all creative acts 
are affected by a stylistic matrix, these acts of type II cognition are as well. They operate 
through the application of both the cognitive and the stylistic categories. 
 Type I cognition is limited by transcendent censorship via the cognitive 
categories. The stylistic categories do not affect type I cognition.49 Type II cognition is 
limited by both transcendent censorship and the stylistic categories. Therefore all 
knowledge acquired via type II cognition is culturally relative.50 The stylistic categories 
function both positively and negatively in cognition, and these two functions are 
intrinsically related. They function as a structural medium for revelation of mystery and 
as a limit to this revelation (“stylistic brakes”). Thus the abyssal categories both lead 
humans to create and prevent human creativity from reaching absolute adequacy.51 
 Corresponding to the two types of cognition and the two types of limits on 
cognition, there are two definitions of truth that spring from Blaga’s philosophy of 
culture. In type I cognition, truth consists in a relation of correspondence between an idea 
and reality.52 This is what Blaga names “natural truth.” This type of truth involves the 
46 Ibid., 186. 
47 Blaga, Geneza Metaforie ∏i Sensul Culturii, 414. 
48 For a more detailed explanation of Blaga’s epistemology, see Jones, The Metaphysics 
of Religion, ch. 5, “Blaga’s Epistemology.” 
49 This does not imply that type I cognition is not interpretive—all human knowledge of 
this world is interpretive, even type I cognition, which interprets based on the cognitive 
categories. Blaga, Experimentul ∏i Spiritul Matematic, 657. 
50 Blaga, tiint| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 199, 211. 
51 Blaga, Fiin⇔a Istoric|, 492–94. 
52 “ecua⇔ie intre idee ∏i realitate” (Blaga, Geneza Metaforei ∏i Sensul Culturii, 417). 
Blaga is well aware that this definition of truth raises a criteriological issue, but we 
cannot enter into that discussion here. 
                                                 
application of the cognitive categories to empirical data. Because the cognitive categories 
are not influenced by culture, “natural truth” is not subject to cultural influences.53 
 What is judged to be true in type II cognition, on the other hand, is relative to 
one’s stylistic matrix. What is judged to be true does not depend only upon the criteria of 
logic and concrete intuition. It involves style, culture, and a feeling of resonance between 
the proposition and the cognitive subject.54 “Judgments of appreciation, which refer to 
‘constructed’ truths, will vary therefore according to how the people’s stylistic matrices 
vary.”55 This is because what is being judged is not the relation between an idea and a 
supposedly observable reality, but the relation between an idea that is a construct and a 
reality that is known to be hidden. The fact that the reality is hidden necessitates that 
constructive nature of the idea. The constructive nature of the idea implicates the 
incorporation of culture (since all constructs are cultural constructs according to Blaga’s 
analysis). The incorporation of culture implicates the employment of the stylistic 
categories, as much in the appreciation/evaluation of the idea as in its construction. 
 That type II cognition involves culture in its truth-judgments has implications that 
reach far beyond philosophy. Even science is affected by this conception, since scientific 
hypotheses and theories are constructs that involve type II cognition.56 The extent to 
which Blaga was convinced of this is revealed in his startling statement that “the new 
physics . . . is more the expression of our kind of thinking and of our style, than the 
reflection of an objective reality.”57 Furthermore, he argues that the domination of one 
mode of rationalization over others within science, and the overthrow of one mode of 
rationalization by another, provide an argument for the significance of style as a factor in 
scientific change.58 
 Both type I and type II cognition operate by utilizing categories. These categories 
both facilitate and limit cognition. In this way the two types of categories work together 
to fulfill the Creator’s “principle of the conservation of mystery.”59 
Philosophy of Culture and Blaga’s Metaphysics 
 Blaga’s philosophy of culture dovetails with his metaphysics.60 Blaga’s 
metaphysical system posits the existence of a single source of all other existents and that 
53 Ibid., 417–18. Both types of cognition attempt to reveal mystery. The former does so in 
a cognitive way that is subject to specific limits, and the latter does so in a cognitive-
constructive way that is subject to additional limits, 447, 449ff. 
54 Ibid., 417–18; see also Blaga, tiin⇔| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 180. 
55 Ibid., 418. 
56 Ibid., 417–18. A brief but useful discussion of Blaga’s writings on philosophy of 
science and culture is  Mircea Flonta’s article, “Analiza cultural| a cunoa∏terii positive”, 
in Dimensiunea metafizic| a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu⇔|, 257–
60. 
57 Blaga, tiint| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 160–61. See also Angela Botez, “C>mpul stilistic ∏i 
evolu⇔ia ∏tiin⇔ei” in Dimensiunea metafizic| a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez 
and A. Firu⇔|, 261–66, where Botez compares Blaga’s philosophy of science to that of 
Thomas Kuhn and other recent thinkers. 
58 Blaga, Experimentul ∏i Spiritul Matematic, 685. 
59 Blaga, Fiin⇔a Istoric|, 490, 502–3; tiin⇔| si Crea⇔ie, 176 (footnote). 
60 For a more detailed explanation of Blaga’s metaphysics, see Jones, The Metaphysics of 
                                                 
this source created the cosmos in such a way as to both perpetuate and preserve creation. 
It created humanity with specific abilities and limits that both motivate and enable 
humanity to approach mystery, but that also prevent humanity from eliminating 
mystery.61 
 Blaga’s philosophy of culture elaborates one of the devices that the originator of 
the cosmos put in place to accomplish these goals. That device is culture, understood as a 
collection of stylistic factors. Culture is key to perpetuating through humanity the 
Creator’s creative act, for culture is essential to human creativity. Culture is also key to 
preserving creation, for it prevents humanity from accurately revealing mystery through 
humanity’s creative acts, which (according to Blaga) could endanger the cosmos by 
allowing a cognitive rival to the Creator. 
 The Creator protects itself from the possibility of human rivalry by the stylistic 
limiting of human revelatory acts. The Creator also prevents this rivalry by creating 
humanity in such a way that humans put a positive value on style rather than viewing 
style and culture as limits imposed upon humanity by the Creator (Blaga calls this tactic 
“transcendent conversion”).62 According to Blaga’s metaphysics, culture is a positive 
value, but it is also a necessary and useful limit upon human revelation of the mysterious. 
The relativity that culture imposes upon all human creations has the perhaps tragic effect 
of isolating humanity from the absolute, but Blaga asserts that at the same time it gives 
humanity a dignity beyond comparison.63 
Claimed Practical Benefits of Blaga’s Philosophy of Culture 
 A practical benefit of Blaga’s philosophy of culture is that it yields explanations 
to a number of perennially vexing problems. For example, Blaga’s theory provides an 
explanation of how styles are originated. Two views on the origin of style are widely 
accepted. It is often supposed that a particular style is initiated by an individual and then 
others imitate that style, causing its spread. Conversely, it is sometimes held that a style 
exists independently of any individuals and imposes itself upon individuals.64 Blaga 
rejects both of these views. Against the first view he points out that expressionist 
painters, Bergson’s psychology, and Mach’s physics all reflect the same fundamental 
style, but that they were ignorant of each other’s work, therefore imitation cannot be the 
Religion, ch. 4, “Blaga’s Metaphysics.” 
61 The Creator uses the cognitive categories to limit cognition and the stylistic categories 
to limit construction. When humanity tries to penetrate mystery, it turns to the immediate, 
but this way is blocked by transcendent censorship. Humanity therefore turns to creative 
constructs, but that way is blocked by stylistic braking. Therefore humanity never 
completely succeeds in penetrating mystery. In this way humanity is maintained in its 
permanently creative state. Blaga, Geneza Metaforei ∏i Sensul Culturii, 450–51. 
62 Blaga, Diferen⇔ialele divine, in Trilogia Cosmologic|, vol. 11 in Opere, ed. Dorli 
Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1988), 179, and Arta ∏i Valoare, in Trilogia 
Valorilor, vol. 10 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1987), 631–32. 
63 Blaga, Aspecte Antropologice, in Trilogia Cosmologic|, vol. 11 in Opere, ed. Dorli 
Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1988), 293, Fiin⇔a Istoric|, 467 (“destinul tragic ∏i 
mare⇔”); Geneza Metaforie ∏i Sensul Culturii, 459. 
64 Blaga states that the second of these views is a development of a Hegelian view on one 
of the attributes of the Idea. Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 181. 
                                                                                                                                                 
explanation of how they came to share the same style. Blaga’s theory of a subconscious 
stylistic matrix, however, nicely explains this parallelism: the appearances of the same 
style in the works of people within the same culture who are not aware of each other’s 
works are due to their shared stylistic matrices. Differences between their works are 
explained by variations between the particular secondary categories within the stylistic 
matrix of each individual.65  
 Similarly, Blaga’s theory of style illuminates the nature of the relationship 
between an individual and a collective group. The problem involves questions such as, 
what is the relationship between an individual and a collectivity to which that individual 
belongs? What distinguishes an individual as belonging to one collectivity rather than 
another? What is it that distinguishes between different collectivities? Why are there 
differences between individuals within the same group? Is a collective group a real unit, 
or is it nothing more than a collection of individuals, the latter being the real existent? Or 
are individuals merely exponents of the group, and the group the real existent? 
 Blaga reviews and rejects the solutions proposed by romanticism, positivism, and 
naturalism. His own partial solution to the problem (he grants that there are other aspects 
in addition to the stylistic one) sees the collectivity as a community of individuals with a 
shared stylistic matrix.66 The individual, on Blaga’s view, shares in these categories and 
has additional categories that are unique to that individual. Particularly individualistic 
people can, moreover, reject some of the categories shared by that individual’s group. 
Therefore the individual is neither merely a component of the collectivity, nor is the 
community merely a conglomeration of individuals. Seen through the lens of Blaga’s 
philosophy of culture, the distinguishing characteristics and “familial resemblances” of 
both the individual and the group are seen to result not from one or the other being a “real 
existent” but from shared and not-shared abyssal categories.67 
 This explanation of the relationship between individuals and communities leads to 
an elucidation of a further problem: the problem of cross-cultural communication. The 
question of whether it is really possible to overcome cultural barriers and have effective 
cross-cultural communication is not a new one.68 Many have argued that cross-cultural 
communication is doomed to produce misunderstanding. Blaga takes it as evident that 
this is not always the case. He argues that any overlapping elements of two different 
stylistic matrices facilitate communication between the matrices. He states that points in 
common can be sufficient not only for communication between the two, but also make 
possible the influencing of one culture by another and the “contaminating” of one culture 
by another.69 
 A further benefit of Blaga’s philosophy of culture, and in particular his view on 
the thwarting of the human aspiration toward the transcendent, is that it confers meaning 
65 Ibid., 181–83. 
66 Blaga, Geneza Metaforie ∏i Sensul Culturii, 439. 
67 Ibid., 437–39; Orizont ∏i Stil, 184ff. 
68 Blaga writes that Spengler is among those who believe that all cross-cultural 
communication results in misunderstanding. He states that Spengler did little more than 
transpose Leibniz’ metaphysics onto a philosophy of culture, making cultures comparable 
to monads without windows, and therefore incommensurable. Ibid., 184–85. 
69 Ibid., 185. 
                                                 
upon the relativity of all human productions. That human creations are always of finite 
scope, limited duration, and mitigated success is often viewed as a human shortcoming. 
Blaga’s philosophy of culture provides an explanation for these “shortcomings” that 
shows their value and removes their condemnation. Humanity’s aspiration toward the 
transcendent is laudable, and the failure to reach this goal is a result of important factors 
that are necessarily beyond the human reach.70 The Creator’s creation of humanity with 
an insatiable desire for the transcendent is, according to Blaga’s philosophy of culture, an 
expression of the Creator’s care for creation.71 
The Problem of Inter-religious Understanding: The Contemporary Debate 
There is a debate in contemporary philosophy over the possibility or impossibility 
of inter-religious understanding. This problem is perhaps more widely acknowledged in 
the Continental than in the analytic tradition, but has also received some attention in 
English-language philosophy of religion.72 Inter-religious dialogue has become a very 
important theater of religious and philosophical reflection. However, frustration is a 
common experience in inter-religious dialogue. This has led to a dialogue about 
dialogue.73 Some have suggested that even dialogue does not guarantee the ability of 
overcoming the barriers to inter-religious communication, and therefore such frustration 
may always be part of some attempts at inter-religious communication.74 Two questions 
related to such a communicational chasm must be addressed: the question of its existence 
and size, and the question of whether such a chasm (if one truly exists) can be overcome. 
70 This philosophy was perhaps of some comfort to Blaga himself, whose struggle to 
reach God or grasp the ultimate meanings of the universe is reflected in both his poetry 
and his philosophy, as is explained in Keith Hitchins’ introduction to Brenda Walker’s 
translation of Blaga’s poetry, 45–48. Brenda Walker, trans., Complete Poetical Works of 
Lucian Blaga (Ia∏i, Romania, Oxford, Portland, OR: The Center for Romanian Studies, 
2001). 
71 Blaga, Geneza Metaforie ∏i Sensul Culturii, 452. 
72 Influential Continental philosophers have written on the topic of inter-ideological 
communication; see, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1975), and Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), and Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982); and Jηrgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1971), and Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1987). For views from English-language philosophy of religion, see many of the 
contributions to Religious Pluralism and Truth: Essays on Cross-Cultural Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. Thomas Dean (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), and 
some of the contributions to Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard 
Swidler (New York: Orbis Books, 1987). 
73 A dialogue about dialogue is what takes place in Toward a Universal Theology of 
Religion, ed. Leonard Swidler, especially sections 3, 4, and 5, 118–250. 
74 See, for example, Norbert M. Samuelson, “The Logic of Inter-religious Dialogue,” in 
Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 146; and Raimundo Panikkar, “The 
Invisible Harmony: A Universal Theory of Religion or a Cosmic Confidence in Reality?” 
in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard Swindler, 124–32. 
                                                 
 That there exist a number of religions and ideologies that are so different from 
each other that they encounter difficulties in understanding each other is not disputed. It 
is possible to view the differences between these belief systems as insignificant and 
surmountable, as significant but surmountable, or as significant and insurmountable. If 
the differences between these belief systems are accepted as being significant, it is 
possible to view the conflicting beliefs involved either as truly incompatible or as 
complementary. 
 It is possible to view religious diversity positively or negatively. Positively, many 
view diversity as having aesthetic benefit. Some also view diversity as having pragmatic 
benefits. Negatively, it could be argued that among multiple incompatible beliefs on a 
given subject only one of them can be correct, and that therefore diversity often points to 
widespread cognitive error. It can also be pointed out that diversity often leads to 
conflict.75 
 Inter-religious communication is useful, perhaps even critical, to avoiding conflict 
between groups holding to different beliefs. It would seem that since all humans are 
probably descended from common ancestors and since all humans inhabit largely similar 
environments, all human belief systems should be reducible to a set of common elements. 
If, on the other hand, real pluralism (multiple incompatible systems) exists, then there can 
be no inclusive reconciliation except at the cost of the elimination of pluralism.76 The 
diversity of existent belief systems could be a result of a situation in which a variety of 
distinct equally valid interpretations is possible, or it could simply be an indication that 
human cognition is prone to error. That disparate beliefs are as widely held and 
pervasively defended as they are has been taken to suggest that there is more than one 
possible and accurate way of interpreting reality. On the other hand, it could be an 
indication of the extent of human cognitive error. 
 It has been suggested that if all belief systems are reducible to a set of common 
elements, then there exist sufficient commonalties within the nonreduced systems to 
enable communication.77 If, on the other hand, real pluralism exists, interideological 
communication may not be possible. 
 In addition to these epistemological facets of the problem of inter-religious 
communication there is an aesthetic aspect to the problem. It can be argued that the 
valuation of truth-criteria is aesthetic: that the valuation of homogeneity or consistency 
over diversity or paradox, and vice versa, is an aesthetic judgment. It is also possible that 
the weight given to certain kinds of support in one tradition versus other types of support 
in another tradition (e.g., historical evidence rather than contemplative experience) is 
based on aesthetic criteria, and that allegiance to a system is sometimes a result of the 
75 See S. Mark Heim, “Different Views of Difference,” in Heim, Salvations: Truth and 
Difference in Religion (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995) 131-144. 
76 “The striving for categorial unity between different worlds necessarily leads to 
reductionism either in the form of semantic/ontological imperialism or of abstract 
synthesism.” Ashok K. Gangadean, “The Hermeneutics of Comparative Ontology and 
Comparative Theology,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 228.  
77 This has been argued by Noam Chomsky; see Chomsky, Rules and Representations 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 206–15, 226, 232–34, and many other 
passages. 
                                                 
personal appeal and satisfaction of a system, which may vary from one individual to 
another. The price of unity may be the loss of diversity or of individual identity, and vice 
versa. So, what might seem like gain to one may seem like loss to another. Furthermore, 
the price of diversity and/or individual identity may be the loss of universal intelligibility 
(it has been argued that diversity entails incommensurability).78 If that is the case, then 
inter-religious communication may only be possible at the cost of diversity and 
individuality. 
 It has been argued, from the perspective of hermeneutics, that the meanings of 
terms are strictly relative to the belief systems in which they are used.79 Some have 
argued that because of this, belief systems can only be understood from within, and 
therefore there can be no objective comparison or evaluation of such systems.80 This 
argument may err in viewing such understanding as an “all-or-nothing” affair. It may be 
more accurate to view understanding as occurring in degrees (that is, understanding 
might better be viewed as being shallow, poor, good, better, profound, etc.). If that is the 
case, it still may be possible that systems of belief can only be well understood when 
understood from within. 
A number of thinkers have also argued that there is no neutral ground from which 
competing truth-claims can be viewed—no “God’s-eye perspective”—and that therefore 
it is not possible to have an objective evaluative comparison of the truth-claims of 
different belief systems. However, this argument may overlook the significant distinction 
between truth-claims and truth-criteria. While truth-claims differ in such situations, truth-
criteria might possibly be the same, which might make possible the evaluation of the 
truth-claims of adherents to various belief systems. Ninian Smart has analyzed a variety 
of attitudes toward religious diversity and criteria by which religions can be 
evaluationally compared, and has concluded that although there are no absolutely neutral 
arenas of comparison, there are at least seven valid inter-religious evaluative criteria.81 
78 Heim, 132. On diversity and incommensurability, see Margolis, Historied Thought, 
Constructed World, 169; Gangadean, “The Hermeneutics of Comparative Ontology and 
Comparative Theology,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 229. 
79 Ashok K. Gangadean, “The Hermeneutics of Comparative Ontology and Comparative 
Theology,” 225–26. 
80 This is argued by Michel Foucault in “What is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32–50. A similar line of 
thought is applied to religions by Panikkar, in “The Invisible Harmony: A Universal 
Theory of Religion or a Cosmic Confidence in Reality?” in Toward a Universal Theology 
of Religion, ed. Leonard Swidler, 118–53, and perhaps in Dean’s “Universal Theology 
and Dialogical Dialogue” (ibid.), where he states that “Theology, as a human, cultural, 
historical enterprise, can be done only from some particular perspective or other, and any 
claims to be able to dispense with such a perspective or to universalize it must simply be 
rejected” (173). 
81 Ninian Smart, “Truth, Criteria, and Dialogue,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. 
Thomas Dean, 67–71. The seven criteria that Smart lists are: 1. The appeal to religious 
experience; 2. The appeal to history; 3. The appeal to charismatic authority; 4. The appeal 
of ethical fruits; 5. The appeal of “modernity”; 6. The appeal to psychological relevance; 
and 7. The appeal to aesthetic properties. 
                                                 
William Wainright, sympathetic to Smart’s analysis, has proposed additional criteria.82 
Additionally, it is possible that all belief-systems share at least some minimal number of 
common elements (common experiences, common communicative elements, etc.). These 
shared elements may enable inter-religious communication,83 but more than that, how 
successfully these common elements are accounted for by each system can be a criterion 
of evaluation. 
Central to the issue of the possibility of inter-religious communication, then, are 
two important and interrelated questions: 1. Which is more significant, the shared 
elements of human belief systems or the differences between human belief systems? and 
2. Do the shared elements of human belief systems provide a basis for inter-religious 
communication, or do the differences between them prevent such communication? Some 
have argued that the two opposing forces (difference and commonality, or 
communication and estrangement) may exist simultaneously, and that the concurrence of 
the two may in fact be a primary factor in dialogue.84 No accord has been reached about 
the possibility of such a resolution of this dilemma: the questions of the 
commensurability and the communicability of belief systems continue to be discussed by 
philosophers, religion scholars, and linguists. 
The Problem of Inter-religious Understanding: Blaganian Contributions 
One of the questions posed earlier in this article was whether or not a 
communication and understanding chasm exists between differing belief systems. Blaga 
seems to admit that such a chasm does exist. This is implied in his statements to the effect 
that cultural and subjective factors play a large role in determining the reception or 
rejection of metaphysical systems. Blaga addresses the issue more directly in a short 
discussion of the supposed “impermeability of cultures” in Orizont ∏i Stil.85 In light of 
Blaga’s emphasis on the role of culture in cognition, his constructivism, and his 
epistemological modesty with regard to the knowledge of other kinds of cognitive 
objects, it would be no surprise if he sees inter-ideological communication as being 
potentially problematic. 
82 William Wainright, “Doctrinal Schemes, Metaphysics and Propositional Truth,” in 
Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 73–86. Wainright’s additional criteria 
are internal consistency, coherence, simplicity, scope, explanatory adequacy, and 
existential or pragmatic utility (81). 
83 As is argued in Habermas’ theory of “universal pragmatics,” and also in Gadamer’s 
understanding of philosophical hermeneutics, see Mary Ann Stenger, “Gadamer’s 
Hermeneutics as a Model for Cross-Cultural Understanding and Truth in Religion,” in 
Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 156–62. 
84 Dean discusses the significance of religions being open to dialogue and simultaneously 
being opaque from the point of view of being understood by other religions in “Universal 
Theology and Dialogical Dialogue,” in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. 
Leonard Swidler, 170.  
85 “Impermeabilitatea culturilor,” Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 184. In this context Blaga 
criticizes Spengler for supporting the view of such impermeability, accusing Spengler of 
transposing Leibniz’ metaphysics onto a philosophy of culture, and thus making cultures 
comparable to monads without windows, 184–85. 
                                                 
 Blaga’s philosophy goes beyond merely affirming the existence of such a chasm: 
it offers a possible explanation of its source. According to Blaga’s philosophy, the 
probable reason for the problematic nature of communication between belief systems is 
stylistic braking, which has been introduced in the first part of this article. Stylistic 
braking is a method employed by the Creator for the purpose of preserving its own 
hegemony and thereby preserving the order of creation. Stylistic braking operates by 
necessitating that all human creations, including belief systems, occur through the 
guiding and molding influences of the abyssal categories formed into a stylistic matrix. 
 Religions and other similar ideological systems involve both type I (paradisaic) 
and type II (luciferic) cognition. Religious beliefs of the type I sort involve truth-claims 
of a correspondence nature that can be easily communicated and are relatively easy to 
verify or falsify. Claims such as “Siddhartha Gautama is the founder of Buddhism,” 
“Mohammad taught that religion should not be a matter of coercion,” and “Jesus rose 
bodily from the dead” are “natural” truths that are readily understood and tested. 
Religious beliefs of the type II sort involve creative constructs that provide 
theoretical explanations of the issues relevant to the particular belief system. Since all 
creative acts are affected by a stylistic matrix, the creative constructs of type II cognition 
are as well. Therefore the theoretical explanations offered by any religion are affected by 
the culture of the people involved in constructing that religion. Furthermore, the belief 
system of any religion is not a single construct: it is a complex of constructs. Religions 
involve a complex interweaving of large numbers of elements derived at least in part 
from the historical cultural settings of the people who have constructed them. 
 Here it becomes important to point out that stylistic matrices affect not only the 
production of stylistic creations, but also their reception. As was stated earlier, luciferic 
cognition is limited by both transcendent censorship and the “stylistic brakes,” which are 
the abyssal categories that comprise any stylistic matrix. Because of this, all luciferic 
cognition is culturally relative.86 The abyssal categories function both positively and 
negatively in cognition, and these two functions are intrinsically related. They function as 
a structural medium for the theoretical cognition, and as a limit to this cognition (it is the 
latter that is properly the “stylistic brakes”). Thus, as previously stated, the abyssal 
categories both facilitate human creativity and prevent human creativity from reaching 
absolute adequacy.87 Likewise, the abyssal categories both facilitate theoretical cognition 
and prevent such cognition from being positive-adequate. 
 Because of these factors, religious beliefs of the type II sort involve truth-claims 
that are constructivist, claims that involve judgments of appreciation in addition to 
judgments of correspondence. Sometimes these beliefs cannot be easily communicated 
and are difficult or impossible to verify or falsify. Claims such as “Buddhism is the 
deepest philosophy,” “Islam is the purest monotheism,” and “Jesus lived an unparalleled 
life” involve subjective evaluations the acceptance of which is dependent upon harmony 
with a person’s abyssal categories and the cultural matrix that they form. 
 The fact that human theoretical constructs are so intrinsically cultural may explain 
why different belief systems sometimes seem to each other to be opaque. Understanding 
a belief system or the statements of its adherents is not so simple and straightforward as it 
86 Blaga, tiin⇔| ∏i Crea⇔ie, 199, 211. 
87 Blaga, Fiin⇔a Istoric|, 492–94. 
                                                 
at first appears. Understanding a belief system involves sharing in or at least 
understanding the cultural matrix that produced it. This involves the sharing or at least 
understanding of a whole complex network of cultural and historical elements, including 
the four primary components of a stylistic matrix and a potentially large number of 
secondary components, that may be largely foreign to the person trying to do the 
understanding. 
 A second question posed earlier in this article was whether this chasm can be 
overcome. The heightened emphasis that Blaga places on the cultural factors in cognition 
and creation might make it seem that inter-religious understanding is doomed to failure, 
or at best to very moderate success. According to Blaga, however, it is the very same 
cultural factors that render inter-religious understanding problematic that also make it 
possible. 
 According to Blaga, all (complete) humans have a cultural (stylistic) matrix.88 
This matrix is defined as a group or constellation of factors that together determine the 
style of the creations of a person or society. It is the sum of all the stylistic categories and 
their influences upon a person's creativity. A cultural matrix is composed of four primary 
factors and an unspecified number of secondary factors (as was explained earlier). 
 Two different creative styles can be separated by as little as one of these 
secondary factors. It is theoretically possible that two belief systems could be truly 
incommensurable: this would be the case if their creative elements are completely 
different, which would be the case if their respective matrices share no common factors 
(primary and secondary). In reality, however, this is not the case. Stylistic categories are 
shaped by the environment in which one lives. Environmental commonalties can lead to 
similarities in stylistic matrices. Since all humans share some environmental 
commonalties, it seems that there will always be at least some areas of overlap between 
stylistic matrices. 
 Just as differences in matrices are responsible (at least in part) for the difficulties 
of inter-religious communication, overlapping areas of matrices are what enables inter-
religious communication.89 Since all humans have at least some areas of overlap between 
their stylistic matrices, there is always a foothold for inter-religious communication. It is 
the existence of commonalties between stylistic matrices that enables understanding and 
communication between cultures. According to Blaga, the extent of theoretical 
commensurability resulting from inter-matricial overlap goes beyond mere understanding 
and communication: he states that it enables “contamination” of one culture by another.90 
88 Blaga does not directly address the question of the status of those humans who, 
because of a mental disability, are not able to function on the level of luciferic cognition. 
His writings make it clear that he views luciferic creativity as the acme of humanness. 
They might also be taken to imply that luciferic creativity is necessary to full human 
personhood. 
89 It seems possible that some instances of communicative difficulty may be caused by 
simple accidental misunderstanding. Likewise, it seems possible that some instances of 
communicative success may be due simply to happy accident. 
90 “Teorea noastr| despre ‘matricea stilistic|’, în înteles de complex incon∏tient de factori 
determinan⇔i discontinui, care pot fi izola⇔i, lamure∏te modul cum, cu toata 
                                                 
 The questions posed at the beginning of this section of the article involved the 
existence and extent of the communicational chasm between religions and the question of 
whether such a chasm (if one exists) can be overcome. In attempting to answer these 
questions three related issues surfaced: 1. Which is more significant, the shared elements 
of human belief systems or the differences between human belief systems? 2. Are the 
differences between belief systems something that should be valued, or are they 
something that should be overcome? and 3. Do the shared elements of human belief 
systems provide a basis for inter-religious understanding and/or communication, or do the 
differences between them prevent such understanding and communication? Blaga’s 
philosophy has provided tentative answers to all of these questions. 
 According to Blaga’s philosophy, the differences between belief systems are 
significant. They are the significant expressions of the culture and the creativity of those 
who are their creators. These differences form a chasm between the belief systems. They 
impede inter-religious understanding. Both from the perspective of type I cognition and 
from the perspective of type II cognition, Blaga would say that positive-adequate 
cognition of a religion is not possible. 
 Since these differences are a result of religion being a creative attempt to 
understand and express ultimate realities, the differences between religions are something 
that should be valued. The distinctives of each religion reflect the cultural creativity of 
that religion’s adherents, and are every bit as much a work of art as are the paintings, 
music, and literary masterpieces of that culture. However, can the adherents of one 
religion understand another religion enough to appreciate its differences without rejecting 
them outright? When a religion makes assertoric statements about the nature of ultimate 
reality, it is doing more than merely expressing deep inner feelings: it is making 
statements the veracity, suitability, or cogency of which would seem to be open to public 
evaluation. Is such evaluation precluded by the bias built into every human by the 
cultural matrix that s/he has already absorbed? This is the third question raised above: is 
such evaluation possible without the inevitable result of the adherents of the second 
religion misunderstanding and therefore misevaluating the statements of the first? 
 According to Blaga’s analysis, the differences that separate religions only account 
for part of the situation. The other parts of the situation involve the non-constructivist 
(“natural”) elements of religions, and the commonalties between the abyssal matrices that 
shape religions as human creations. The type I elements of religions are fairly easily 
shared and can serve as a basis for and beginning of inter-religious understanding. 
Furthermore, all humans share at least some common abyssal categories and some 
common elements in the stylistic matrices that these create. These commonalties are 
extremely important, for they enable people from different religions to begin to 
understand each other’s constructivist beliefs and to communicate regarding their type II 
cognitions. It is at this last stage that real inter-religious understanding is most 
challenging and also most interesting: the possibility of truly understanding and 
appreciating another person’s evaluative beliefs offers the greatest hope for peace and 
reconciliation between religions. 
specificitatea unei culturi sau a unui stil, e totu∏i posibil| ∏i contaminarea de la cultur| la 
cultur|, de la stil la stil,” Blaga, Orizont ∏i Stil, 185. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Thus it can be seen that, according to Blaga’s philosophy, both the differences 
and the commonalties between belief systems are significant. Neither seems more 
significant than the other within Blaga’s system. The commonalties are effective in 
providing a basis of inter-religious communication, but they neither eliminate nor 
depreciate the differences between belief systems. Differences should be respected and 
appreciated as cultural productions. We should strive honestly to understand them, 
realizing that our own evaluative beliefs are also culturally conditioned products of 
stylistic matrices. Blaga’s philosophy and the commonalities between matrices do not 
guarantee that inter-religious communication and understanding will be easy. However, 
they do show us both that inter-religious communication and understanding are possible 
and why they are possible. Thus Blaga’s philosophy of culture promotes a high regard for 
culture and cultural distinctness and at the same time vindicates, enables, and promotes 
efforts at inter-religious understanding. 
Conclusion 
This article has discussed a number of issues that are of intense interest to religion 
scholars, philosophers, and sociologists in Europe, America, and also in the Orient. It has 
shown that significant insights into these issues can be found in Blaga’s philosophy. 
Unfortunately, Blaga’s philosophy has yet to be translated into English. While there are a 
number of articles discussing Blaga’s philosophy in English, and my own 300-page book 
describing his philosophy and applying it to contemporary issues in philosophy of 
religion is soon to be published in America, it is still the case that most of the world is 
unable to benefit from philosophical insights like those described above for the simple 
reason that they cannot read Blaga for themselves. It seems evident that Romania has the 
obligation to make this striking philosopher available to the rest of the world: for the sake 
of the understanding and appreciation of differences, for the sake of inter-ideological 
communication, and for the sake of the other philosophical insights that the world will 
find in his work. 
 
 
